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ARTICLE 
MARYLAND TREADS WATER OVER ELECTIVE SHARE 
REFORM: THE SPOUSE’S DESPERATE CRY FOR THE 
COURT’S INTERVENTION WITH A BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
FOR REVOCABLE TRUSTS 
By: Angela M. Vallario * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     Despite extensive progress protecting the marital relationship 
between persons regardless of gender, Maryland has failed to 
financially protect the marital right of a surviving spouse on the death 
of his or her spouse.  One of the most important marital rights is 
financial protection on the death of one’s spouse, known as the elective 
share.  Maryland’s elective share statute was enacted in 1969 when 
Maryland abolished dower and curtesy. The elective share is intended 
to protect a spouse from disinheritance by their partner. But because it 
only extends to the decedent’s probate estate, this statutory protection 
has been severely undermined by the increasingly popular inter vivos
transfers to a revocable trust.  
     A revocable trust is created, inter vivos, when the property owner 
single-handedly declares himself as trustee, to hold for himself for life, 
and provides for a distribution upon death.  Furthermore, a revocable 
trust, created either by declaration of trust or by a transfer of property, 
is not rendered invalid because the trust creator retains substantial 
control.1  Thus, a revocable trust is a de facto will that easily avoids the 
elective share by a change in legal title from a probate asset (subject to 
the elective share statute) to a non-probate asset (beyond the elective 
share statute), allowing the creator to use and enjoy the property in same 
fashion after this transfer as before. 
     Over the years, the courts have necessarily intervened to protect the 
legal share of the spouse from inter vivos transfers using judicial 
doctrine as a deterrent. Initially, the courts referred to the doctrine as 
*Angela M. Vallario is a professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law; 
B.S. (University of Florida); J.D. (University of Baltimore School of Law); L.L.M. 
(Georgetown Law Center). I am grateful for my wonderful research assistant, Carley 
Wilbourne, who assisted with both research and citation.  I am also grateful to Emily 
Berg for her research assistance. 
1 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-7-112 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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“fraud on marital rights,” but more recently they have referred to the 
deterrent frustrating the spouse’s elective share with “sham transfers.” 
Regardless of its name, the doctrine results in uncertainty, unfairness, 
and inadequacy for the surviving spouse who, will be required to endure 
the costs, burdens, and risks of litigation to advocate for a legally 
protected marital right. Although the doctrine provides some measure 
for evaluating whether other inter vivos transfers should be available for 
the elective share, this approach should not be required for a revocable 
trust.   
     There are two avenues for eliminating this inequity: (1) legislation 
and (2) reform through case law. Maryland would benefit from 
legislation, and has passed significant trusts and estates legislative 
reform, like the Maryland Trust Act, which offers a roadmap for elective 
share reform. However, over the last 20 years sporadic elective share 
reform efforts have failed. This is due to a number of factors.  These 
include the fact that Maryland’s elective share bills lack a driving force 
behind the legislation, change time and time again, are without unified 
support from the estates and trust and/or elder law bar sections, and the 
general assembly lacks understanding of a complex topic.  
     The Uniform Probate Code’s model provides a possible legislative 
solution because that model is objective, has been heavily vetted, and is 
recognized by a majority of states. However, Maryland’s recent elective 
share reform efforts suggest that approach is unlikely. The Uniform 
Probate Code model has been rejected by the estates and trust and elder 
law bar sections, who have become accustomed to advising clients on 
techniques such as the revocable trust which have a detrimental 
consequence for the disinherited spouse.  
     The time has come to accept that the only effective recourse is 
through case law. The court must protect the surviving spouse from 
disinheritance with a revocable trust.  To protect a spouse, the revocable 
trust like the probate estate, must be included in the pool of assets 
subject to Maryland’s elective share. Although most states have 
accomplished this with legislative reform, Maryland has not. The Court 
of Appeals must remedy this wrong because legislative action has not 
occurred. The time is ripe for Maryland Courts to follow the path taken 
in Massachusetts, and other states, and create a bright-line rule for 
revocable trusts in order to protect this important marital right.2
2 See Sullivan v. Burkin 460 N.E.2d 577 (1984) (where the court, in reversing 
Kerwing v. Donaghy, 317 Mass 559 (1945), changed its previous stance on 
revocable trusts and held that the revocable trust was included in the pool of assets 
for the elective share); see also Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W. 194 (Iowa 2006); Moore v. 
Jones, 44 N.C. App. 578 (1980);  Dreher v. Dreher, 370 S.C. 75 (2006). 
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II. MARYLAND’S MARRIAGE-FRIENDLY MARITAL 
PROTECTIONS
     Maryland promotes marriage in many ways and can be generally 
viewed as a marriage-friendly jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals has 
recognized that marriage is the “most important contract into which 
individuals can enter.”3  Moreover, actions taken that discourage 
marriage may be challenged as a violation of public policy.4  Some 
marital rights attach upon marriage to pre-marital assets and continue 
after the death of a spouse.  For example, the right to a deceased 
spouse’s Social Security,5 the spouse’s right to inherit under intestacy,6
and the protection against disinheritance with the elective share.7  In 
Collins v. Collins, the Court in addressing the elective share stated, “[a] 
marital right, which in common with all legal rights, is a proper subject 
of legal protection.”8
3 Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 418 (2007) (quoting Fornshill v. Murray, 1 
Bland 479, 481 (1828)); Conaway, 401 Md. at 326 (“Appellees seek the right to 
marry, understanding that a civil marriage license entitles married couples to a vast 
array of economic and social benefits and privileges -- the rights of marriage -- as 
well as other intangible benefits.”). 
4 Bowman v. Weer, 204 Md. 344, 348 (1954) (“Of course, a condition in general 
restraint of marriage, whether of a man or of a woman, as a general rule has been 
held in law as being contrary to public policy and void.”) (citing Edgar G. Miller The 
Construction of Wills: In Maryland, 879 (1927)); Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 39 
Ohio Misc. 28, 28 (1974) ( “If the condition in a will were that the beneficiary not 
marry anyone would be held to be contrary to public policy and void.); See Gordon 
v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197 (1955); United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Or. 
530 (1954); Capps v. Capps 216 Va. 378 (1975). 
5 42 U.S.C.S. § 1382 (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that when a worker files for 
retirement benefits, the worker's spouse may be eligible for a benefit based on the 
worker's earnings). See also Soc. Sec. Adm. Pub. No. 05-10084 Survivors Benefits 
(Mar. 2018); https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-o5-10084.pdf (noting survivors benefits 
are based on the deceased spouse’s earning record). 
6 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that if the 
intestate is survived by a spouse, the surviving spouse will inherit at least one-half of 
the decedent’s probate estate). 
7 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (LexisNexis 2018) (providing that the 
surviving spouse may elect against the deceased spouse’s estate and take one-half or 
one-third of the decedent’s probate estate, instead of what was provide under the 
will). 
8 Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 479 (1904) (quoting Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3
Del. Ch 99 (1867) (finding in favor of the spouse, when decedent secretly made an 
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     Within the last decade, Maryland has made progress in protecting 
marriage, as marital rights have been extended to “all individuals” 
regardless of sexual orientation.9  The Civil Marriage Protection Act in 
2012 began the journey of extending marital rights to all individuals.10
Following the Civil Marriage Protection Act, the Supreme Court in US
v. Windsor and ultimately in Obergefell v. Hodges, noted “no union is 
more profound.”11  Despite monumental strides with the Civil Marriage 
Protection Act’s marriage-friendly legislation and strong public policy 
favoring protection, Maryland has not provided any meaningful 
protection to a spouse’s marital right, the elective share.12    
III. MARYLAND’S CURRENT ELECTIVE SHARE LAW
     Maryland is a separate property state where a married couple has the 
ability to accumulate and title property separately in their individual 
names.13  Therefore, on the death of one spouse, Maryland legally 
protects the surviving spouse from disinheritance by extending the 
spouse a statutory marital right known as the “elective share.”14  The 
inter vivos transfer property retaining a life estate in himself 20 days before 
marriage).
9 See MD. CODE. ANN., FAMILY LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2018) (“Only a marriage 
between two individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying is valid in 
this State.”). 
10 Maryland Office of the Attorney General, The State of Marriage Equality in 
America (April 2015), available at 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Reports/The%20State%20of%20Marriage
%20Equality%20 
in%20America%202015.pdf (the Civil Marriage Protection Act was ultimately 
ratified by the voters on November 6, 2012, with 52.4% of the vote). 
11 US v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013) (“The States’ interest in defining and 
regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems from the 
understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of 
certain statutory benefits…) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“No union is more profound 
than marriage…”). 
12 Shimp v. Huff, 315 Md. 624, 646 (1989) (“In addition, § 3-204 suggests that the 
right to receive the elective share is a personal right, which cannot be waived by the 
unilateral acts of others, including the actions of the deceased spouse. These statutes 
and principles of law suggest that there is a strong public policy in favor of 
protecting the surviving spouse's right to receive an elective share”) (emphasis 
added). 
13 See Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the 
Division of Property at Death, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 519, 523 (2003) (discussing the 
common law property system which Maryland follows). 
14 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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elective share is a limitation on testamentary freedom, because if the 
deceased spouse fails to adequately provide for the survivor by will, the 
surviving spouse may elect against the will and take a statutory share.15
Maryland has protected spouses from disinheritance for more than a 
century.16  Historically, the spouse was protected against disinheritance 
with common law’s dower and curtesy rights.17  However, in 1969, 
Maryland abolished these common law rights and replaced them with a 
statute giving the spouse the option to take an elective share rather than 
the property that had been left to the spouse under the decedent’s will.18
Maryland’s current statute provides that, instead of property left by will, 
the spouse may elect to take a one-third share if there are surviving 
issues or one-half of the net [probate] estate if there are no surviving 
issuse.19 Since Maryland’s elective share statute can only be taken as to 
the deceased spouse’s probate estate, the surviving spouse can be totally 
disinherited not by a will, but with a revocable trust.  
     Nearly fifty years have passed since the enactment of Maryland’s 
elective share statute, which provides that a surviving spouse is entitled 
to a fractional share of the deceased spouse’s probate estate.20  The 
15 Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 406 Md. 469, 504-06 (2008) (“...although we previously 
referred to this judicial authority as the doctrine of fraud on marital rights, on more 
than one occasion, we have stated more aptly its purpose: ‘to balance the social and 
practical undesirability of restricting the free alienation of personal property against 
the desire to protect the legal share of the spouse.’”).
16 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 504, n.25 (“Maryland enacted its original elective share 
statute in 1798…That statute, the forerunner to Section 3-203, provided, in pertinent 
part, that a widow who renounces her right to take under her husband's will ‘shall be 
entitled to one third part of the personal estate . . ., which shall remain after 
payments of his just debts, and claims against him, and no more.’). 
17 Vallario, supra note 13, at 526 (“Like much of the common law throughout the 
United States, the legal protection for a surviving spouse at the death of his or her 
spouse can be traced to England.  Individual states in America adopted the English 
concepts of dower and curtesy to protect the surviving spouse at the death of his or 
her spouse. Dower protected the wife, while curtesy was the protection extended to 
the husband.”). 
18 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (1978) (LexisNexis 2018) (replacing 
MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (1969)) (“The share of a surviving spouse 
shall be: (1) if there is also surviving issue, one-third (1/3); (2) if there is no 
surviving issue but a surviving parent, one-half (1/2);  (3) if there is no surviving 
issue or parent but a surviving brother or sister, or issue of a brother or sister, four 
thousand dollars ($4,000) plus one-half (1/2) of the residue; (4) if there is no 
surviving issue, parent, brother, sister or issue of a brother or sister, the whole.”).
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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elective share statute does not provide adequate protection for the 
spouse because either spouse can deplete his or her probate estate by 
single-handedly transferring probate assets to a revocable trust.21   Due 
to the inadequacy of the elective share statute, Maryland courts needed 
to intervene to protect a spouse from inter vivos transfers. Therefore, 
Maryland’s elective share law represents a combination of statute and 
necessary judicial doctrine. 
     Maryland courts initially adopted the “fraud on marital rights” 
doctrine to curtail a deceased spouse from circumventing the surviving 
spouse’s marital rights.22  This doctrine does not require ‘fraud’ in the 
classic sense.23  Instead, every non-probate transfer requires a judicial 
examination to determine whether the transfer violated a surviving 
spouse’s marital rights.24  Furthermore, uncertainty surrounds the 
doctrine because there is “no general and completely satisfactory rule” 
defining “fraud on marital rights.”25  Moreover, Maryland courts have 
difficulty with articulating the “fraud on marital rights” doctrine.26
     As early as 1904, Maryland courts identified the need for judicial 
intervention.27  In Collins v. Collins, the Court stated, “[w]here a man, 
immediately before his marriage, privately and secretly conveys, his 
21 See RESTAT 3D OF TRUSTS, § 25 (2012) (“In short, despite modern efforts to 
simplify the probate process … revocable trusts created by declaration or by transfer 
to another are often preferred by property owners as means of holding and disposing 
of their property. Accordingly, the revocable trust is widely used as a legally 
accepted substitute for the will as the central document of an estate plan…”). 
22 See Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md 1, 18 (1954);  Knell v. Price, 318 Md. at 
501, 512 (1990); Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 498 (quoting Johnson v. La Grange State 
Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 364-65 (1978)).
23 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 514 (citing White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 666 (2003)). 
24 Id. at 514 (“In the context of [§ 3-203], fraud in the classic sense is not at issue and 
a court should instead look for an improper circumvention of the marital rights of the 
surviving spouse. Instead of speaking of fraud, the courts would speak of violation 
of marital rights.”) (citing White, 875 A.2d at 666 (2003)). 
25 Knell, 318 Md. at 512. 
26 Whittington, 205 Md. at 23; Gianakos v. Magiros, 234 Md. 14, 29 (1964); see 
generally Knell, 318 Md. 501 (reversing the judgement in favor of the mistress, 
which was rendered by the intermediate court of appeals); see also Schoukroun, 406
Md. 469 (reversing the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and remanded 
the case to the trial court with guidance to consider the nature of the underlying 
transaction and the decedent's intent, reservation of rights, moral claims, testate 
provisions for and inter vivos gifts to the spouse, and familial relationships.); see 
New Fiduciary Decisions: Transfer in Fraud of Marital Rights, WG&L EST.
PLANNING J. (2008) (“The non-UPC states have muddled along in uncertainty, as 
demonstrated by the case of Schoukroun v. Karsenty … from the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals.”).
27 Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 57 (1904). 
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estate to a trustee for himself, in order to defeat his wife of dower, such 
conveyance will be deemed fraudulent and void.”28  The Court went on 
to state, “[i]f a husband seized in fee should, immediately before his 
marriage, vest the legal estate in trustees to disappoint his intended wife 
of dower, such a conveyance would be reckoned fraudulent, because it 
was made with an ill conscience in order to deprive his wife of the 
provision made for her by the common law.”29  Although Collins was 
based on rights under common law, Maryland’s elective share statute 
remains inadequate and continues to require intervention from the 
courts. 
     Fifty years later in Whittington v. Whittington, the court examining 
the inter vivos creation of joint bank accounts, wrestled with the 
doctrine and developed criteria for others to follow:   
The completeness of the transfer and the extent of 
control retained by the transferor, the motive of the 
transferor, the participation by the transferee in the 
alleged fraud and the degree to which the surviving 
spouse is stripped of his or her interest in the estate of 
the decedent spouse have all been considered material, 
and no one test has been adopted to the exclusion of all 
other tests…. There are several other factors which have 
been or may be considered as pertinent, such as the 
relative moral claims of the surviving spouse and of the 
transferees, other provisions for the surviving spouse, 
whether or not he or she has independent means and the 
interval of time between the transfer and the death of the 
transferor.30
     After an examination of the other assets the spouse had received, and 
noting no fraud or undue influence on the part of the beneficiaries, the 
court, using the “fraud on marital rights” doctrine, found no basis upon 
which the joint accounts should be stricken.31
     The struggle with this judicial doctrine did not improve as a result of 
the replacement of the common law rights with the elective share 
statute. In Knell v. Price,32 the estranged surviving spouse successfully 
28 Collins, 98 Md. at 479. 
29 Id.
30 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 494-95 (quoting Whittington, 205 Md. at 77). 
31 See Whittington, 205 Md. at 14. 
32 Knell, 318 Md. at 501. 
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argued that an inter vivos conveyance through a straw man was a fraud 
on her marital rights.33  In Knell, the Court held the conveyance 
constituted a fraud on the surviving spouse’s marital rights because the 
decedent did not part with the absolute dominion and control over the 
property during his life.34  In so holding, the court found that “his 
conveyance, through a straw man, of the remainder of the property 
pronounce[d] this to be a fraud on marital rights.”35  In Knell, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland cited Whittington for the proposition that no 
general rule had yet evolved in Maryland, but did not examine the 
Whittington criteria.36
     The most recent judicial examination of the doctrine took place in 
Karsenty v. Schoukroun, when the court rejected the terminology of 
“fraud on marital rights” noting the doctrine had little to do with fraud 
and was inconsistent with the weight of Maryland precedent.37  In 
Schoukroun, the court stated:  
Indeed, although we previously referred to this judicial 
authority as the doctrine of fraud on marital rights, on 
more than one occasion, we have stated more aptly its 
purpose to balance the social and practical undesirability 
of restricting the free alienation of personal property 
against the desire to protect the legal share of the 
spouse.... Our reference to ‘fraud’ with respect to the 
decedent's use of the trust form meant that the inter vivos 
transfers were in bad faith. And, perhaps most 
significantly, [i]t would be helpful if instead of speaking 
of ‘fraud’, the courts would speak of ‘violation of marital 
rights’.... Notwithstanding our previous references to 
‘fraud’ on marital rights, because we ultimately are not 
concerned with whether a decedent intended to deprive 
her or his surviving spouse of property, we emphasize 
today that it is more helpful for a court to think of a 
‘sham transfer’ in this context as an unlawful frustration 
of the surviving spouse's statutory share.38 (emphasis 
33 Knell, 318 Md at 512-13. 
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 512 (arriving at its decision without discussing any of the Whittington
factors, and instead, stating “Mr. Knell retained control of the property during his 
lifetime by establishing a life estate in himself in himself with unfettered power in 
him, while living (except no will), to dispose of all interests in the property in fee 
simple.”). 
37 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 489.  
38 Id. at 511. 
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added). 
     In Schoukroun, the decedent established a revocable trust which, 
upon the decedent’s death, provided for his minor daughter.  The 
creation of the revocable trust allowed the decedent to single-handedly 
transfer his property outside the reach of the spouse’s elective share.  In 
Schoukroun the surviving spouse argued that her elective share should 
extend to the decedent’s revocable trust because the decedent 
maintained complete control over the estate planning vehicle, and that 
this factor alone amounted to a per se fraud on her marital rights.39  The 
Court, in reversing the intermediate appellate court, rejected the 
surviving spouse’s argument and instead required each case to address 
the Whittington criteria where it found the revocable trust did not 
amount to a sham.40
     In Schoukroun, the Court of Appeals provided three (3) 
considerations to lessen the cumbersome analysis as to whether an inter 
vivos transfer is considered “a sham.”41  The first question is whether 
the decedent retained control or continued benefit over the transferred 
property.42  Second, the court should strive to not disrupt the decedent’s 
legitimate estate planning.43  Finally, a court should employ the 
Whittington factors when scrutinizing an inter vivos transfer to 
determine whether the transfer was a “sham.”44  The Schoukroun Court 
suggested that the decedent’s dominion and control over a revocable 
trust was not a per se violation of the surviving spouse’s marital rights.45
     In Maryland, since a spouse can accumulate and title property 
individually, state law provides protection against disinheritance by 
39 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 481; see, e.g., Knell, 318 Md. 501 (“…it is perfectly clear 
that Mr. Knell retained control of the property during his lifetime by establishing a 
life estate in himself with unfettered power in him, while living, to dispose of all 
interests in the property in fee simple. He did not part with the absolute dominion of 
the property during his life. His conveyance, through a straw man, of the remainder 
of the property was not complete, absolute, and unconditional. The law pronounces 
this to be a fraud on the marital rights of Mrs. Knell. His reluctance to relinquish 
control over the disposition of the property during his lifetime defeated his 
intention.”) see also Vallario, supra note 13. 
40 Schoukroun, 406 Md. at 526. 
41 Id. at 514-16. 
42 Id. at 515. 
43 Id.
44 Id. (citing Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1 (1954)). 
45 See Schoukroun, 406 Md. 469. 
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way of its elective share.46  The existence of Estates and Trusts § 3-203 
demonstrates that Maryland has an interest in protecting the spouse 
from disinheritance.47  Property ownership has gravitated to non-
probate arrangements, like the revocable trust, which are not covered by 
the statute.48  But one spouse should not be able to unilaterally transfer 
an asset from probate to non-probate and avoid the elective share. This 
marital right warrants legal protection from that possibility.49   
      Although the judicial doctrine provides some measure for a 
disinherited spouse to challenge inter vivos transfers, a spouse should 
not be required to litigate for legal protection from the revocable trust.  
Maryland’s inadequate elective share law requires just that.  Reforming 
Maryland’s elective share law is required for Maryland to be the 
marriage-friendly jurisdiction it aimed for in its passage of the Civil 
Marriage Protection Act.50  Ideally, Maryland should learn from other 
successful reform efforts, and mimic those paths, to enact elective share 
reform. 
IV. ROADMAP TO TRUST AND ESTATES REFORM
     Maryland has enacted significant legislative reform in the trust and 
estates area over the last two decades.  Successful legislative efforts 
have been made in the enactment of the Maryland Trust Act,51 the 
Power of Attorney Act (Loretta’s Law),52 Modified Estate 
Administration,53 and the Maryland Uniform Disclaimer Act,54 the 
46 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (LexisNexis 2018). 
47 Martin D. Begleiter, Grim Fairy Tales: Studies of Wicked Stepmothers, Poisoned 
Apples, and the Elective Share, 78 ALB. L. REV. 521, 528 (2015) (suggesting the 
existence of a statute is the primary source of public policy as declared by the 
legislature). 
48 See RESTAT 3D OF TRUSTS, § 25 (confirming a revocable trust is widely used as a 
will substitute). 
49 Shimp, 315 Md. at 646 (“This Court on other occasions has recognized the strong 
public policy interest in protecting the surviving spouse's elective share from the 
unilateral acts of a deceased spouse.”). 
50 MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2018). 
51 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 14.5-101-1006 (LexisNexis 2018); (codifying 
Maryland trust law).  
52 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 17-101-204 (LexisNexis 2018) (establishing 
the Limited and General Power of Attorney Act, which established formality 
requirements, enforcement provisions, and statutory forms). 
53 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 5-701-10 (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing 
streamline administration under specified circumstances). 
54 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 9-201-16 (LexisNexis 2018) (recognizing 
procedures for refusing an inheritance). 
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Uniform Transfers to Minors Act,55 the Slayer’s Statute (Ann Sue Metz 
Law),56 Special Needs Trusts,57 Pet Trusts,58 Digital Assets,59
Posthumously Conceived Child,60 and the abolition of the Rule against 
Perpetuities.61   
     Successful legislative reform efforts require support from the 
Maryland State Bar Association.62  Most importantly there must be a 
need for the codification, as legislative reform often benefits from a 
person impacted to spur the legislation.63 Additionally, leadership from 
the estates and trusts and elder law sections of the Maryland bar 
55 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-301-24 (LexisNexis 2018) (authorizing a 
custodian to establish a minor’s trust without court order).  
56 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-112 (LexisNexis 2018); MD. CODE. ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 10-919 (LexisNexis 2018) (disqualifying from inheritance a person who kills the 
testator). 
57 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 14.5-1002 (LexisNexis 2018) (repealing an 
earlier version, MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-114 (2011) and ratifying 
Maryland policy to encourage the use of special needs trusts). 
58 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-407 (LexisNexis 2018); MD. CODE. ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 5-407 (LexisNexis 2018) (repealing an earlier version, MD. CODE.
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-112 (2009), and authorizing the creation of a trust to 
provide for the care of an animals). 
59 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 15-601-20 (LexisNexis 2018) (establishing 
the Maryland Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act; authorizing a user to direct a 
fiduciary access to digital assets under specified circumstances). 
60 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-205(2) (LexisNexis 2018); (expanding the 
definition to those born after the decedent from genetic material).  
61 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b)(5) (exempting certain trusts from 
rule against perpetuities).  
62 Maryland State Bar Association, Meet the MSBA Team, available at 
https://www.msba.org/about/staff/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“…the Director of 
Legislative Relations…reviews all legislation introduced before the Maryland 
General Assembly, and refers bills to the appropriate MSBA Sections and 
Committees.”). 
63 See Angela M. Vallario, The Elective Share Has No Friends: Creditors Trump 
Spouse in the Battle over the Revocable Trust, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 333, 355, n. 3 
(2017) (explaining that all legislative reform requires an impetus); see, e.g., Angela 
M. Vallario, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Not a One-Size-Fits-All Solution,
43 U. BALT. L. REV. 85, 85 n.2 (explaining that the Power of Attorney Act’s impetus 
Loretta Soustek whose niece stole from her) (citing Dennis B. Roddy, Courting 
Trouble: The Document Granting ‘Power of Attorney’ Often Leads to Abuse,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 2007); see also MD. CODE. ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 11-112 (LexisNexis 2018 ) (elucidating that the Slayer’s Statute’s impetus 
was victim Ann Sue Metz, who was murdered by her husband).   
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(collectively “practice areas”)  affected by the reform are required to 
contribute extensive volunteer hours, establish committees and work 
groups, draft legislation, educate law makers and testify before the 
members general assembly.64   
     The Maryland Trust Act (“MTA”) offers a model for legislative 
reform and its efforts should be closely examined as a lesson in how to 
properly reform Maryland’s code.  The MTA was enacted in 2014 after 
multiple years of consistent and cohesive work. The driving force 
behind the MTA was the competitive pressure to clarify, through 
codification, the trust laws in Maryland for administrative 
predictability, and to move Maryland towards the more accepted 
Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) model in order to effectively compete 
with neighboring states.65  The Uniform Law Commissioners 
(“ULC”)66 undertook significant efforts to provide a comprehensive 
model for codifying the law on trusts and promulgated the UTC in 
2000.67   
     The original drafters of the MTA, initially the Section Council of the 
Estate and Trust Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association, 
subsequently joined by the Trust Committee of the Maryland Bankers 
Association (collectively, the “drafters”), used the UTC as a model.68
The drafters formed study groups and began studying the UTC as early 
as 2002 and introduced the first MTA bill in 2011.69 After its debut in 
2011, the MTA was reintroduced each and every year until it became 
law.70 Each bill inched closer to reform. The MTA passed the general 
64 The Estates and Trusts Section Council and its members take the lead in bringing 
legislation forward trusts and estates legislation, with comment and review from the 
Elder Law Section and its members. This article will broadly refer to these groups as 
“practice areas.” 
65 S.B. 722, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012), Hearing before S. Judicial 
Proceedings Comm., (Mar. 7, 2012). 
66 The Uniform Law Commissioners provide states with non-partisan, well-
conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas 
of state statutory law.   
67 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Trust 
Code (Last Revised or Amended in 2010) (January 15, 2013) available at 
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust_code/utc_ final_ rev2010.pdf. 
68 John P. Edgar, Comparison of Maryland Trust Act to Prior Maryland Law and the 
Uniform Trust Code, The Howard Baker Forum (2016) available at 
https://www.bakerdonelson.com/comparison-of-maryland-trust-act-to-prior-
maryland-law-and-the-uniform-trust-code (last visited September 26, 2018). 
69 H.B. 750, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011); S.B. 745, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2011). 
70 H.B. 682, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); S.B. 722, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2012); H.B. 437, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); S.B. 753, Gen. Assem. 
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assembly in 2014 and was added as Article 14.5 of the Maryland Estates 
and Trusts Annotated Code.71   
     Even with passage, however, the MTA work was not done.  In the 
following years, drafters returned with modifications. Several MTA 
modifications (collectively “MTA”) brought the revocable trust even 
closer to resembling a will. For example, the shortened statute of 
limitations (applicable for probate) now are extended to the revocable 
trust;72 and automatic revocation in the event of divorce applicable to 
wills,73now apply to revocable trusts as well.74 The settlor’s capacity 
required to create, amend, or revoke a revocable trust are cross 
referenced to be “the same as that to make a will”,75  as is the procedure 
for challenging a revocable trust.76  The MTA reform has made the 
revocable trust a will replacement, for all purposes except the elective 
share. This unfortunately opens the door for a surviving spouse to be 
totally disinherited by a revocable trust.   
     Over the last two decades, an immense amount of trusts and estates 
reform has been accomplished.  The MTA offers a role model for trusts 
and estates reform. The key to such reform is demonstrated need, 
unified support from the practice areas, along with consistent building-
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); H.B. 83, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014); S.B. 240, Gen. 
Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014). 
71 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 14.5101-1006 (LexisNexis 2018) (effective 
January 1, 2015 allowing practitioners time to comprehend the legislation). 
72 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-508(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (noting the 
statute of limitations consistent with § 8-103 which deals with the limitation imposed 
on probate assets). 
73 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105(4) (providing that in the event of divorce 
“all provisions in the will relating to the spouse, and only those provisions shall be 
revoked unless otherwise provided in the will.”). 
74 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-604(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (noting all 
terms of the trust relating to trust distribution to or for the benefit of the spouse shall 
be revoked). 
75 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-601(a) (“The capacity required to create, 
amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or to direct the actions of the 
trustee of a revocable trust, is the same as that required to make a will.”) (emphasis 
added). 
76 Compare MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-605(2) (“6 months after the 
Trustee sends the person a copy of the trust instrument and a notice informing the 
person of the existence of the trust…”) with MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 5-
207(a)(2) (“…a petition to caveat the later offered will may be filed at a time 
within…six months after the first appointment of a personal representative of a 
probated will.”).  
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block proposals.  From its first proposal in 2011, the drafters had a 
similar and improved-upon bill moving forward each and every year 
until enactment in 2014. This uniform effort allowed the drafters to 
educate and re-educate the members of general assembly on 
comprehensive reform. In learning from the MTA approach, the 
necessary components of statutory reform are: (1) demonstrated need; 
(2) support from the Maryland State Bar Association; and (3) unified 
participation with consistent efforts from the impacted practice areas. 
With the MTA as its role model, can Maryland follow in its footsteps 
and enact elective share reform?  
V. THE FAILED ATTEMPTS AT ELECTIVE SHARE REFORM
     Despite much progress in other areas, Maryland has made no 
progress with elective share reform even though Maryland has a “strong 
public policy interest in protecting the surviving spouse.”77  This article 
examines the elective share reform efforts since 1998 based on 
broadening the pool of assets from which the elective share can be 
taken, a concept knows as the “augmented estate”.78
     Over the last 20 years, there have been five different approaches to 
elective share reform. Unlike the MTA, the legislation introduced has 
not remained consistent or steady. The variety of methods include: (1) 
the 2018 Maryland-specific approach; (2) the 2017 and 2016 federal 
estate tax approach; (3) the 2015 and 2009 revocable trust-only 
approach; (4) the 2014 and 2012 Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) 
approach; and (5) the 2000 and 1999 modified UPC approach.   
     Most recently, the Maryland-specific bill represented work 
completed by the Elective Share Work Group, of which this author was 
a member.79  This was the first time in the history of elective share 
reform efforts that legislators were members of the drafting 
committee.80  The 2018 Maryland-specific proposal defined the 
77 Shimp, 315 Md. 624 at 646 (noting that there is a strong public policy in favor of 
protecting the surviving spouse’s right to receive an elective share) (citing Mushaw,
183 Md. 511).
78 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-203 (composing “augmented estate” to include: (1) the 
decedent’s net probate estate; (2) the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others; (3) 
the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse; and (4) the surviving 
spouse’s probate and nonprobate transfers to others.). 
79 S.B. 649, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B.777, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2018); other members included legislatures, practitioners, and another 
academic. 
80 Delegate Kathleen. M. Dumais, Senator Delores G. Kelley, Delegate Samuel I. 
Rosenberg were members of the Elective Share Work Group. 
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“augmented estate” as an all-inclusive mix of the deceased spouse’s 
probate and non-probate assets. The proposed legislation then reduced 
that amount by a series of complex exclusions.81  The exclusions 
represent various arrangements developed over the years for a variety 
of planning purposes, but also having the effect of allowing the testator 
to avoid the elective share.82  Unlike any other state, the Maryland-
specific proposal includes a judicial “override”, i.e. allowing judicial 
intervention on a showing of clear and convincing evidence and 
codifying the Whittington factors as guidance.83
81 S.B. 649, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B.777, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2018) (proposing the estate subject to the election shall be calculated by 
reducing the value of the decedent’s augmented estate by: … (7) the value of any 
qualifying lifetime transfer of the decedent described in §3-401(I)(1)(II) of this 
subtitled where: (I) the initial transfer took place before the decedent’s marriage to 
the surviving spouse of the decedent; or (II) the decedent’s interest in the property 
transferred terminated more than 2 years before the decedent’s death; (8) … that 
occurred before the later of (I) the decedent’s marriage to the surviving spouse of (9) 
the value of any interest in real property included in the augmented estate by reason 
of the decedent’s retention of a life estate in the real property if (I) at the time of the 
decedent’s death, the decedent held no qualifying power of disposition of the real 
property; and (II) the decedent left estate in the property was created more than 2 
years before the decedent’s death: and (10) the value of the proceeds of any 
insurance policy on the decedent’s life in excess of the net cash surrender value of 
the policy immediately before the decedent’s death, or in the case of term insure in 
excess of the total premiums if certain conditions are satisfied.). 
82 S.B. 649, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B.777, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2018) (stating life estate deeds were excluded presumably because some estate 
planners have used that kind of deed to avoid a Medicaid lien after the death of the 
testator.).
83 S.B. 649, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B.777, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2018) (stating that on the showing of clear and convincing evidence that the 
court may modify the augmented estate and consider the circumstances of any 
transfer or arrangement, including: (I) the extent of control retained by the decedent; 
(II) the motivation for the transfer or arrangement; (III) the familiar relationship 
between the decedent and the beneficiary of the transfer or arrangement; (IV) the 
degree, if any to which the transfer or arrangement deprives the surviving spouse of 
property that otherwise might form part of the value of the augment estate, estate 
subject to election or spousal benefits; (V) the degree, if any, to which the transfer or 
arrangement provides a benefit to the surviving spouse beyond what would be 
available to the surviving spouse as part of the elective share; (VII) the length and 
nature or the relationship between the decedent and the surviving spouse; and (VII) 
the nature and value of the surviving spouse’s assets.).
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     The previous two years, the federal estate tax model was the basis 
for elective share reform.84  This approach required sophisticated estate 
and gift tax knowledge. Although this approach was not unique to 
Maryland, those few states that have adopted it, had done so when the 
federal estate and gift tax rules had lower thresholds. For example, 
Delaware follows the federal estate and gift tax model, adopted in 
Delaware when estates in excess of $600,000 were governed by those 
tax laws.85 Currently federal estate tax only applies when client-wealth 
exceeds $11.2 million for a single person and double that for a married 
couple.86  The federal estate tax model posed additional concerns, 
including a codification of a principle that the purpose of the statue was 
to balance testamentary freedom with the elective share.  That 
articulated principle is contrary to the underlying purpose of the statute 
itself, and to Maryland’s strong public policy to protect its spouses from 
disinheritance.87  Finally, unlike any other state statute, the federal 
estate tax approach punished the spouse for electing against the will, by 
removing the electing spouse from any fiduciary role he or she may 
have been given.88
     The Maryland-specific and federal estate tax models were reform 
efforts taken after the creation of work groups and were supported by 
the practice areas.  Prior to those efforts, there was very little work done 
to reform Maryland’s elective share law.  The 2015 and 2009 revocable-
trust only efforts89 proposed to include a revocable trust in the 
84 S.B. 913, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016); H.B. 1229, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2016); S.B.881, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); H.B. 722, Gen. Assem. 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017). 
85 DEL.CODE ANN. TIT. 12, § 901 (LexisNexis 2018). 
86 26 U.S.C.S. § 2001 (c) (LexisNexis 2018); Maryland Code Ann., Tax § 7-302 
(imposing a state tax on a decedent that is a Maryland resident having taxable situs 
in Maryland which is currently $4 million and scheduled to increase to $5 million in 
2019).  
87 See SB 881 HB 722 (§3-402 stating the purpose of the bill was to “ensure that a 
surviving spouse is reasonably provided for during the surviving spouse’s lifetime 
and … provide a decedent flexibility in ordering the decedent’s affairs.”)
88 S.B. 913, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016); H.B. 1229, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2016); S.B.881, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); H.B. 722, Gen. Assem. 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017) (adding    MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §6-306
(Removal) the surviving spouse of the decedent who has made an election to take the 
elective share). 
89 H.B. 645, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009) (attempting to codify the idea that a 
revocable trust should be treated as a probate asset. This bill passed in the House but 
was unfavorably viewed in the Senate with fears that it would frustrate Medicaid 
Planning if an institutionalized spouse predeceased the community spouse); H.B. 
281, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015). 
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calculation, were not the result of any work groups and lacked support 
from the practice areas.  In fact, the 2015 revocable-trust only bill 
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate largely due to 
opposition from the elder law practicing bar.90  Equally, the UPC model 
approach, sponsored by now Attorney General Brian E. Frosh in years 
201491 and 2012,92 were proposed without a workgroup study and were 
rejected by both the estates and trusts and elder law sections of the bar.  
     Prior to the recent reform efforts, the last time there was 
comprehensive study of elective share reform was with the modified 
UPC approach in 2000,93 and 1999.94 Those bills using the UPC as a 
starting point, established a committee, drafted legislation, garnered the 
support of the practice areas, but were defeated because at that time the 
“augmented estate” concept was new to the members of the general 
assembly and, like the MTA would have benefited from additional years 
of consistent work, each year inching closer to reform. Instead, 
Maryland elective share reform efforts lacked unified support, and were 
revived in 2016, 2017 and 2018 with different approaches. 
     Over time, Maryland has offered five different models of elective 
share reform. The recent reform efforts are different from any other 
state.  This is drastically different from the approach taken by the MTA.  
90 Jason A. Frank, Elder Law in Maryland, (4th ed. 2012) (Testimony before the 
Senate Judicial proceedings committee was that Medicaid planning included assets 
that transferred to the community spouse so that the institutional spouse could 
qualify for Medicaid was titled in a revocable trust.  In the event the community 
spouse predeceases the institutional spouse the proposed bill would expose those 
revocable trust assets to Medicaid payback to the extent of the elective share.) 
91 H.B. 570, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) (providing that a surviving spouse 
would be entitled to an elective share based on the Uniform Probate Code’s 
definition of the augmented estate). 
92 S.B. 633, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012). 
93 H.B. 265, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000) (proposing that the amount of 
marital property depends on the duration of the marriage between the surviving 
spouse and the decedent, with the amount ranging from 10 percent of the elective 
estate for marriages of less than five (5) years to a max of forty percent (40 %) of the 
elective estate for marriages of twenty-five (25) years or more) (the minimum share 
would be the lesser of Fifty Thousand Dollard ($50,000) or one-half (1/2) of the 
elective estate)); in 2008, an Elective Share Committee was formed to study elective 
share reform but no bill was adopted. 
94 H.B. 780, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999) (proposing to authorize a surviving 
spouse, an attorney in fact, or guardian of specified property to take an elective share 
of the decedent’s elective estate instead of property left to the spouse by will. 
Specified the procedures for determining the value and elements of an elective 
share). 
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Maryland should not reinvent the wheel but rather adopt an approach 
more consistent with other states. The UPC proposed a well-established 
model for elective share reform 50 years ago that should be used.95
Maryland should return to the UPC or revive the work done on the 
modified UPC for elective share reform.96  By working on getting one, 
consistent, objective model through the general assembly year after 
year, reform could be achieved.  This approach was successful for the 
MTA, removes the unique aspects brought with the more recent reform 
efforts, and provides uniformity.  The UPC model has been used by 
most of the other trusts and estates reform97 and the uniformity it would 
bring is particularly relevant now, when people are freely mobile, and 
Maryland welcomes the uniform bar exam next year.98
VI. THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
MODEL  
     Most other separate property jurisdictions have effective elective 
share reform.99  The UPC’s model is the starting point for most 
significant trusts and estate reform.100  Some jurisdictions have the UPC 
95 Vallario, supra note 13, at 544 -45 (Discussing the UPC Model first began 
proposing an augmented estate model in 1969).   
96 H.B. 570, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014); S.B. 633, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. 
(Md. 2012); H.B. 265, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000); H.B. 780, Gen. Assem. 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999). 
97 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 14.5-101-1006 Maryland Trust Act); MD.
CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 17-101-204 Power of Attorney Act) MD. CODE.
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 5-701-10 (Modified Administration); MD. CODE. ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS §§ 9-201-16 (Uniform Disclaimer Act); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS §§ 13-301-24 (Uniform Transfers to Minors Act); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 11-112 (Slayer’s Statute) MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-1002 
(Special Needs Trusts); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-407 (Pet Trusts); 
MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 
§§15-601-20 (Digital Assets Act); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-205(2) 
(Posthumously Conceived Child); MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b) (5) 
(Rule Against Perpetuities).  
98 State Board of Law Examiners, General Bar Exam: Updated Statement on 
Maryland’s Transition to the Uniform Bar Exam, available at
https://www.courts.state.md.us/ble/generalbarexam (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
99 Lawrence W. Waggoner & John H. Langbein, Redesigning the Spouse’s Forced 
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 305 (1987); see Vallario, supra note 13 at 
544-58 (discussing augmented estate elective share jurisdictions.).
100 See, e.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Trust Code (Last Revised or Amended in 2010) (January 15, 2013) 
available at www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trust _code/utc_ final_ rev2010.pdf; 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Power of 
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model without significant modifications whereas others make slight 
modifications to the UPC model. In Maryland, the UPC and modified 
UPC reform efforts need to be seriously reconsidered. The UPC’s 
model, although complicated, is comprehensive and represents many 
levels of examination and review not possible by individual 
jurisdictions.  Elective share reform cannot satisfy all interest groups.  
Estate planners want to provide clients with an estate plan that 
effectuates their clients’ choices. But client goals can result in an 
unfortunate consequence for the spouse.   Elder law attorneys want to 
engage in asset protection techniques to avoid Medicaid liens which 
also moves the assets outside the reach of the spouse. Yet Maryland, as 
a separate property state, has a strong policy in favor or protecting the 
spouse’s right to receive an elective share.101 There is no easy resolution 
between all the interest groups that will also adequately protect the 
spouse. The UPC model may not be viewed as a win-win for all, but 
today there is a greater need for more consistency among 
jurisdictions.102  Furthermore, in Maryland there is a movement toward 
uniformity with the uniform bar exam, which is scheduled to be 
effective in July 2019. Uniformity makes sense for many reasons and in 
particular for the spouse’s financial protection after the death of his or 
her spouse.  
     However, in light of the nature of Maryland’s recent reform efforts, 
it appears as if the UPC or modified UPC is highly unlikely to be able 
to get the support of all the important constituencies. Practice areas have 
become wed to the various ways in which their clients can legitimately 
plan their estate plans.  However, the revocable trust selection will avoid 
the elective share under current law. For those practice areas there is no 
Attorney Act (2006) (January 30, 2017) available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/power%20of%20attorney/UPOAA_2011_
Final%20Act_ 2017jan30.pdf; National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (2015) (March 
8, 2016) available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to% 
20Digital%20Assets/2015_ RUFADAA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf.
101 Shimp, 315 Md. 646. 
102 The Uniform Commercial Code is an example of uniform law. Katie Robinson, 
52 Jurisdictions Have Enacted the 2010 Amendments to UCC Article 9, National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (June 15, 2015) available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=52%20 
Jurisdictions%20Have%20Enacted%20the%202010%20Amendments%20to%20UC
C%20Article%209 (last visited October 7, 2018). 
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turning back. The pattern of inconsistent approaches, coupled with the 
lack of support from the practice areas, suggests a statutory resolution 
to the inadequacies of Maryland’s elective share law is not possible. 
Unlike the MTA, there has been no consistent reform movement for 
elective share reform.  Additionally, the impacted practice areas are not 
likely to support non-partisan elective share reform as demonstrated by 
the recent reform efforts and the obvious 16-year gap in unified 
efforts.103   
     Elective share reform lacks the driving force required for 
comprehensive reform.104 The parties who would benefit from such law 
are voiceless spouses, who would not even know about the issue until 
they were affected by it, and it was too late. This catalyst for reform is 
unlikely represented. Practitioners have engaged in legitimate estate 
planning, which avoids the elective share in Maryland with the 
revocable trust. At this point, elective share reform by practice areas 
seems unlikely.  Since the practice areas are unlikely to advance the 
UPC model or anything resembling it, as demonstrated by the recent 
reform efforts advanced by the bar,105 the only hope is for judicial 
intervention. 
VII. COURT INTERVENTION WITH A BRIGHT-LINE RULE FOR 
REVOCABLE TRUSTS.
     Although ideally a job for the legislature, the time has come for the 
Maryland courts to intervene and fix the elective share with a bright-
line test as it relates to the revocable trust. A revocable trust is used 
today as a will replacement or substitute.106  This estate planning vehicle 
allows an individual to take his probate asset and transfer it to himself 
as trustee for the benefit of himself for life, with a dispositive plan 
consistent with testamentary intentions.   The retitling of the assets from 
probate to a revocable trust is what allows for the assets to escape 
statutory protection.  
103 See S.B. 913, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016); H.B. 1229, Gen. Assem. Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2016); H.B. 265, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000) (proposed after 
work study groups). 
104Angela M. Vallario, The Elective Share Has No Friends: Creditors Trump Spouse 
in the Battle Over the Revocable Trust, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 333, 353 (2017).
105 20 S.B. 913, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016); H.B. 1229, Gen. Assem. Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2016); S.B.881, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); H.B. 722, Gen. 
Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); S.B. 649, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); 
H.B.777, Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018). 
106 See RESTAT 3D OF TRUSTS, § 25 (2012) (noting the widespread use of the  
revocable trust as a legally accepted substitute for the will). 
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     For the settlor, the change in legal title from his sole name to his 
name as trustee does not affect his use and enjoyment of the assets. The 
inter vivos transfer of the settlor’s property to a revocable trust is not a 
gift for gift tax purposes;107 the assets remain available to the settlor’s 
creditors;108 and the trust income is reported on the settlor’s individual 
income tax return.109
     The revocable trust requires the same capacity to execute as a will;110
like a will, provides for automatic revocation in the event of divorce;111
and like a will, provides a payout upon the creator’s death.  The only 
difference is that the dispositive provision after settlor’s death is outside 
the supervision of the probate administration process.  
     Upon the settlor’s death, like a will, the revocable trust assets are 
subject to federal estate at the date of death value;112 the beneficiaries 
receive a stepped-up basis;113 and estate creditors are limited to the 
probate period of 6 months.114   
     Today, the revocable trust is a will replacement, allowing assets to 
pass outside the probate administration process, yet for all intents and 
purposes, the revocable trust is simply a different estate planning 
vehicle used to accomplish the identical task. However, the decedent’s 
choice to implement a revocable trust instead of a will allows for those 
assets, to escape inclusion in the elective share statute with a unilateral 
inter vivos transfer. The exclusion of the elective share to revocable 
trusts is not fair, is inconsistent with Maryland’s public policy to protect 
a spouse from disinheritance and is contrary to Maryland’s pro-
marriage stance.115
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108 MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14.5-508(a)(1); see also RESTAT 2D OF 
TRUSTS, § 156 cmt. a (1959) (“The interest of the settlor-beneficiary can be reached 
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     Years ago in  Sullivan v. Burkin,116 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial court, the highest court in the Commonwealth, appreciated the 
inequities of its elective share, noting it is not fair nor equitable to prefer 
divorce over marriage, and that is what Maryland’s elective share 
statute does.117  In so noting, the Sullivan court created a bright-line rule 
as to include revocable trusts in the elective share calculation.118
Massachusetts has not enacted comprehensive elective share reform 
since that 1984 decision, but at least the Massachusetts Court protected 
the spouse from the will alternative, the revocable trust.119
     A lot has changed in the ten years following Schoukroun. The MTA 
makes the revocable trust readily available as a way in which to 
disinherit a spouse. There are no genuine differences between a will and 
a revocable trust for estate planning, except that a revocable trust can be 
used to more easily disinherit a spouse. Although judicial doctrine is 
available and may be necessary to protect the legal share of the spouse 
from other inter vivos transfers, it should not be required to apply such 
doctrine for the revocable trust. The revocable trust, used as a 
“substitute for will and as the central document of the estate plan.”120
The MTA has extended the desired probate protections to the revocable 
trust making it ready available to short cut Maryland stated policy 
against spousal inheritance. Maryland’s elective share statute should be 
reconsidered by the Court of Appeals and it should create a bright-line 
rule with respect the inclusion of revocable trusts in the asset pool 
available for the elective share.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
     A revocable trust is a de facto will as an estate planning device. The 




116 Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864 (1984). 
117 Id. at 872. 
118 Id. at 867. 
119 Boston Bar Association, Report of the Ad Hoc Elective Share Committee: 
Proposed Amendments to the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (2015), 
available at http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default- documen-library/the-spousal-
elective-share-materials.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018, 5:43 PM)(stating 
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for purposes of the spouse’s elective share. Other states began fixing 
this obvious flaw in elective share statutes more than 50 years ago, but 
Maryland has not.  
 At this point, elective share reform advanced by the practice 
areas has failed. The legislation submitted in the past does not fully 
protect the interests of the voiceless spouse.  Recent reform efforts 
prefer freedom of testation over such protection and are unique to 
Maryland and should not be advanced.  Drafters should return to a more 
uniform model, because uniformity and objectivity are more important.   
     Although judicial intervention creating a bright-line test for 
revocable trusts is not a comprehensive solution to a complicated 
problem, it creates an immediate remedy for Maryland’s obvious 
elective share dilemma.  Perhaps judicial intervention finding a bright-
line for revocable trusts will force practice areas to shore up elective 
share reform, and it may follow in the footsteps of the MTA.  But until 
lawmakers act, Maryland’s highest court, like that in Massachusetts, 
and others, should protect spouses from revocable trust disinheritance. 
